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  Since a few years, energy derivative markets rise at a tremendous rate. So are 
prices of energy commodities. Such sustained growths naturally give rise to questions. 
Should we be worried about such a development? Has it gone too far? Are derivatives 
markets really characterized by high leverage effect, opacity, liquidity problems? Do all 
these markets and transactions really respond to a need? Should we restrain the 
transactions of speculators on such markets, before they introduce an excess volatility, 
capable of destabilizing the underlying physical markets?  
  This chapter aims to propose answers to these questions, or part of an answer, 
whenever it is possible. It is focused on derivatives markets2, and more specifically on 
energy derivative markets. In a first section, we give an overview of energy derivative 
markets today. It is very important to understand that, like every derivative markets, 
energy markets appeared when the need for protection against fluctuations in prices 
become really important. In the second section, we explain how energy derivative 
markets are organized today, and how this organization evolves since a few years. More 
precisely, there is a progressive fusion of organized and over-the-counter markets, which 
has a lot of consequences on their functioning. In the third section, we present the 
economic functions of derivative markets. Indeed, such markets do not only allow the 
management of prices risks. They also authorize speculation and arbitrage –it is 
important to know whether this is a good or a bad thing – price and volatility discovery – 
which is useful not only for market participants, but also for worldwide producers and 
consumers – and transactional efficiency – creating thus benchmarks that are used as a 
reference for many transactions. In the fourth section, we examine the influence of 
derivative markets on physical markets, systemic risk and we give our opinion 
concerning the idea that derivative markets might be intrinsically dangerous.  
 
1. ENERGY DERIVATIVE MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
In this section, we first present the historical background of energy derivative 
markets, from the creation of petroleum markets to electricity markets. Then we 
comment upon the recent evolution of these markets: their sustained growth – in 
volumes and in prices – and their introduction in asset portfolio management strategies. 
We also compare them with traditional financial assets.  
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: delphine.lautier@dauphine.fr. Delphine Lautier is also associate research fellow at the Ecole des 
Mines ParisTech (Cerna).  
2 Thus, we will talk about capital markets, i.e. markets aiming at raising funds.     27/04/2009 
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1.1. The creation of derivative markets in the energy industry 
 
The history of energy derivative markets is in line with the history of other 
derivatives instruments. Whatever the underlying asset is concerned, the same rule 
prevails: derivative markets are always created when the volatility on the physical asset 
appears, or becomes important.  
  Table 1, which summarizes the introduction dates of the most important 
derivative contracts on energy markets, gives a good illustration of that point. The first 
energy derivative instrument was launched in 1978, on a petroleum product. This is not 
by chance; indeed, at the end of the 1970s, the second petroleum shock definitively 
indicates the end of stability for petroleum prices. Moreover, on a petroleum product, 
there was no threat of an oligopoly’s action, as could have been the case with crude oil.  
The fear of volatility induced, during the next ten years, the creation of 
derivatives instruments for all important petroleum products, at first in the United 
States, then in Europe: crude oil, heating oil and gas oil. 1983 is an important milestone 
as the two futures contracts on crude oil are, in 2008, the two energy contracts that are 
the most intensively traded worldwide.  
Table 1. Energy derivatives – key dates 
Year  Futures contract’s underlying asset  Exchange 
1978 Heating  oil  Nymex3 
1981 Gas  oil  IPE4 
1983  Crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) 
Crude oil (Brent) 
Nymex 
IPE 
1984 Unleaded  gasoline  Nymex 
1987 Propane  Nymex 
1990 Natural  gas  Nymex 
1996 Electricity  Nymex 
1997 Natural  gas  IPE 
2001 Electricity  IPE 
2001 Coal  Nymex 
2007 Uranium  Nymex 
  Sources: Exchanges 
The 1990s testify the apparition on derivative markets on electricity and natural 
gas. This corresponds to the period succeeding the deregulation of the underlying 
markets. The movement was once again initiated by the United States and followed a 
few years later by Europe. As 5 to 10 years are needed for a derivatives market to 
                                                 
3 Nymex stands for New York Mercantile Exchange. 
4 IPE stands for International Petroleum Exchange.    27/04/2009 
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mature, it is not sure, today, that the coal and uranium futures markets will survive.  
1.2. The recent evolution of energy derivative markets 
 
  The growth rate of energy derivative markets is tremendous. In 2006, 
transactions on energy futures markets progressed at a rate of 37.8%. This is the second 
highest rate recorded worldwide on organized markets, whatever the underlying asset is 
considered. With a 43.6% of rise recorded in the activity on futures markets, currencies 
are at the first place5. The third and fourth places are occupied by, respectively 
agriculture commodity products (+28.4%) and metals (+27.8%).  
  Among energy derivatives, crude oil stands at a specific place. As shown by Table 
2, the futures contracts on crude oil negotiated on the Nymex are at a first place 
worldwide, with 71.05 millions contracts exchanged in 2006. If we add the 28.67 millions 
contracts negotiated on the Intercontinental Exchange (Ice), the transactions volume 
turns into 99.62 millions! Let us remind that the volume of this futures contract is 1 000 
barrels… Moreover other energy derivative instruments occupy the 4th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 
14th, 15th, 17th places: energy derivative instruments are thus very important in the 
commodity futures industry. Last but not least, futures contracts on electricity do not 
appear in Table 2.  
Table 2. Top 20 Commodity Contracts in 2006 (in millions) 
Rank Contract  2006  2005  %  change 
1  WTI Crude Oil Futures, Nymex  71.05  59.65  19.12 
2  Corn Futures, DCE  64.98  21.86  197.24 
3  Corn Futures, CBOT  47.24  27.97  68.92 
4  Brent Crude Oil Futures, Ice Futures  44.35  30.41  45.82 
5  High Grade Primary Aluminium, LME  36.42  30.43  19.69 
6  Soy Meal Futures, DCE  31.55  36.74  -14.12 
7  White Sugar Futures, ZCE  29.34  **  NA 
8  WTI Crude Oil Futures, Ice Futures  28.67  **  NA 
9  Rubber Futures, SHFE  26.05  9.50  174.09 
10  Henry Hub Swap Futures, Nymex  24.16  10.41  132.14 
11  Natural Gas Futures, Nymex  23.03  19.14  20.31 
12  Soybean Futures, CBOT  22.65  20.22  12.03 
13  Gold Futures, Tocom  22.23  17.96  23.78 
14  WTI Crude Oil Options, Nymex  21.02  14.73  42.71 
15  Natural Gas Options, Nymex  19.52  6.97  180.06 
16  Copper Futures, LME  18.87  19.23  -1.91 
17  Gas Oil Futures, Ice Futures  18.29  10.97  66.70 
18  Wheat Futures, CBOT  16.22  10.11  60.42 
19  Gold Futures, Nymex Comex Division  15.92  15.89  0.17 
20  Sugar #11 Futures, Nybot   15.10  13.01  16.10 
                                                 
5 This extremely high progression level is mainly due to a reorganization of the market, which is similar to the changes 
observed in energy markets (see section 2 for more details on that point).     27/04/2009 
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** Introduced in 2006 
Source : Futures Industry Association  
  Another important feature of energy derivative markets is their volatility. As 
Table 3 illustrates it, commodities at large appear as more volatile than traditional 
financial markets (with the exception of the interest rate on the Japanese currency) and, 
among commodities, natural gas and crude oil record the highest prices fluctuations.  
Table 3. Volatility Comparison (annualized volatility, in %) 
Market 2005  2006 
Interest Rates (money market) 
    Eurodollar 
    Euribor 









Interest Rates (government bonds) 
    10-year Treasury notes (US) 
    Bunds (Germany) 










    S&P500 
    Euro Stoxx 50 










    British Pound 
    Euro 










    Crude oil 
    Natural gas 
    Wheat 
    Corn 
    Copper 















Sources: Futures Industry Association & Calyon Financial  
  These different characteristics, combined with a sustained rise in the prices of the 
underlying physical markets, explain why energy derivative markets have been at the 
centre of attention since a few years. Recently, these markets have attracted new 
operators, like hedge funds or institutional investors. This is not a real surprise: the 
majority of energy markets are now mature: they can be considered as free of liquidity 
problems, at least on the shortest delivery dates (for more detail on that point, see 
section 4). This is precisely the kind of markets that speculators best appreciate. 
Nowadays, these markets are even considered as a new asset class for portfolio 
management which, as we will see a bit later, might create some difficulties.     27/04/2009 
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To complete this overview, let us however remind that, among derivatives at 
large, the energy futures markets still occupy a very modest place, as Table 4 states it.  
Table 4. Global Futures and Options Volume (in millions) 
  2006 2005  %  Change 
Equity Indices  4,453.95  4,080.33  09.16 
Interest Rates  3,193.44  2,536.77  25.89 
Individual Equities  2,876.49  2,356.87  22.05 
Currency 240.05  167.19  43.59 
Agriculturals 486.37  378.90  28.37 
Energies 385.97  280.13  37.78 
Metals 218.68  171.06  27.84 
Other 4.31  2.59  66.69 
Total 11,859.27  9,973.82  18.90 
Source: Futures Industry Association  
  Even with a tremendous growth rate, energy derivatives are far less important, in 
the futures industry, than interest rates or equities. Moreover, as the gap between these 
different classes of asset is very high, energy derivative will stay for a long time at this 
place.  
 
2. THE ORGANIZATION OF ENERGY DERIVATIVE MARKETS  
 
  A first step towards the understanding of energy derivatives markets’ functioning 
is to explain what a derivative is. Then, it is important to make a distinction – at least at 
first – between organized and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Once this distinction has 
been established, it will be possible to explain what happens today in derivative 
markets: the progressive fusion of organized and over-the-counter markets. This 
evolution began in energy derivative markets. Step by step, this movement spreads over 
the other underlying assets and transforms the organization of all derivative markets.  
 
2.1. What is a derivative product?  
 
  Derivatives instruments are financial contracts whose price is derived from that 
of an underlying asset such as exchange rate, interest rate, credit risk or commodity. The 
nature of the underlying asset may be very various. More precisely, the underlying asset 
may not be a physical or a financial or even a traded asset. Indeed, financial markets 
have recently witnessed, for example, the apparition of derivatives markets on climate, 
or credit risk. Another interesting point is that the underlying asset may be… another 
derivative product! This kind of construction is widespread in energy derivative markets 
where the underlying asset of options – a specific category of derivative instruments – is 
very often a futures contract, namely another derivative product. Such a phenomenon    27/04/2009 
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naturally nourishes the fear of a systemic risk in derivative markets, the latter being 
viewed as Russian dolls.  
Once this general presentation has been made, what are the most commonly used 
derivative instruments? The answer is: forward, futures, swaps and options.  
  A forward contract is a private agreement negotiated between two counterparts. 
It aims to exchange a given quantity of the underlying asset – let us say, for example, 
100,000 barrels of crude oil – in a fixed point in the future. Such a contract defines: the 
volume of the merchandise, its quality, its delivery place, its delivery date and the 
forward price of the transaction. The latter generally leads to a physical delivery and is 
traded on the OTC market.  
  Futures contracts are the most important energy derivative products. They may 
be defined as standardized forward contracts. The former are negotiated in organized 
markets, whereas the latter are used in over-the-counter markets. The standardization 
concerns each characteristic of the transaction except for its price (which is a futures 
price). The degree of standardization is usually extremely high (see Box 1 for an 
illustration on the American crude oil futures contract). This rigidity in the specifications 
of the futures contract is compensated by facilitating its transfer between different 
counterparts and avoiding the problems of liquidity and delivery (the latter are quite 
frequent with forward contracts). A consequence of the standardization is that the 
transactions on futures contracts rarely lead to a physical delivery. Futures contracts are 
purely financial instruments.  
 
Box 1. The standardization of the American crude oil futures contract:  
The light sweet crude oil contract6 
z Trading unit: 1,000 US barrels (42,000 gallons) 
z Price Quotation: U.S. dollars and cents per barrel 
z Trading hours:  
Open outcry trading is conducted from 10:00 AM until 2:30 PM.  
Electronic trading is conducted from 6:00 PM until 5:15 PM via the CME Globex® trading 
platform, Sunday through Friday. There is a 45-minute break each day between 5:15PM (current 
trade date) and 6:00 PM (next trade date). 
z Trading months:  
The current year and the next nine years. A new calendar year will be added following the 
termination of trading in the December contract of the current year 
z […] 
z Delivery:  
F.O.B. seller's facility, Cushing, Oklahoma, at any pipeline or storage facility with pipeline access 
to TEPPCO, Cushing storage, or Equilon Pipeline Co., by in-tank transfer, in-line transfer, book-
out, or inter-facility transfer (pumpover).  
                                                 
6 Extracted from the characteristics of the futures contract on Light Sweet Crude Oil, Nymex Mercantile Exchange.    27/04/2009 
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z Deliverable grades:  
Specific domestic crudes with 0.42% sulfur by weight or less, not less than 37° API gravity nor 
more than 42° API gravity.  
The following domestic crude streams are deliverable: West Texas Intermediate, Low Sweet Mix, 
New Mexican Sweet, North Texas Sweet, Oklahoma Sweet, South Texas Sweet. 
Specific foreign crudes of not less than 34° API nor more than 42° API.  
The following foreign streams are deliverable: U.K. Brent and Forties, for which the seller shall 
receive a 30 cent per barrel discount below the final settlement price; Norwegian Oseberg Blend 
is delivered at a 55¢–per–barrel discount; Nigerian Bonny Light, Qua Iboe, and Colombian 
Cusiana are delivered at 15¢ premiums. 
 
  Swaps are the most important derivative products: they reassemble at least 50% 
of the total transactions on OTC derivatives worldwide, whatever the underlying asset is 
considered. Swaps are also private agreements negotiated between two counterparts. 
They lead to the exchange of floating and fixed prices, at regular intervals. Thus, there is 
no physical delivery with a swap. Most of the time, these instruments are used for a 
long-term horizon. For example, in the gas market, one has witnessed swaps for a 20 
years commitment. Lastly, swaps may be considered, on a financial point of view (i.e. for 
valuation purposes) as portfolios of forward contracts. The former insure a protection 
against a recurrent price’s risk, whereas the latter are particularly useful when hedging 
a punctual risk.  
  Contrary to forward, futures and swaps, options give the right and not the 
obligation to buy (call option) or sell (put option) the underlying asset. This right may be 
used at or before a specified expiration date and at a fixed price, which is usually called 
the strike. As a result of the flexibility associated to the right given by the option, this 
instrument is more costly than are firm derivatives like futures and forward contracts. 
Options are also fundamentally asymmetrical assets: whereas the buyer of the option 
has a right, the seller undertakes an obligation; moreover, the value of the option is 
nonlinear, at it corresponds to the maximum value of zero (when the right is not used) 
and a positive value. Lastly, options may be traded as well on organized markets as on 
OTC markets.  
 
2.2. Organized versus over-the-counter markets 
 
Derivative markets can be separated into two different but complementary 
categories: organized and over the counter markets. This distinction must be clearly 
understood, before the time when we will say that it now disappears, because it gives a 
very useful tool to deal with the new complexity of the organization of energy derivative 
markets.  
 
    27/04/2009 
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2.2.1. Organized markets and exchange-traded derivatives 
 
Organized markets are generally characterized by their centralization around a 
commercial exchange, where all trade occur (this characteristic becomes nowadays less 
important as electronic trading and quotation grow in importance). They are also 
characterised by the presence of a clearing house. 
The clearing house fulfils two economic functions: the management of credit risk 
trough the mechanism of initial margin and margin calls (see Box 2) and the 
management of market’s liquidity trough the centralization of the transactions. 
Liquidity is also insured, as mentioned before, by the extreme standardization of the 
contracts. Thus, on organized markets, it is easy to find a counterpart. The owner of a 
futures contract will always be able to sell it easily and quickly – which is not the case 
for a forward contract.  
A last characteristic of futures markets is their transparency: prices are free and 
publicly available, immediately. This is why an economic function fulfilled by organized 
market is, as we will see a bit later, price discovery.  
Box 2. The management of credit risk through initial margin and margin calls 
Initial margin and margin calls are tools used by the clearing house in order to insure the 
management of credit risk in the commercial exchange.  
Margin calls aim to prevent a participant from accumulating day after day a financial loss 
and from becoming unable to fulfil his financial commitments. The clearing house determines 
every day, at the end of the transactions session, the settlement price that will be used for the 
valuation of all existing positions in the market. If, on the basis of this settlement price, a 
participant has loosed some money since the previous day, he will have to pay to the clearing 
house the difference between the present and former values of his position: he is “called at the 
margin”. This money will go to the participants whose positions’ value increased since the 
previous day (this illustrates the fact that the markets are zero sum games).  
Each day, the transactions on the exchange can begin only once all margin calls are paid. 
Otherwise, where a participant unable to fulfil his commitment, he would be pushed out of the 
market. In such a situation, the clearing house uses the initial margin in order to compensate for 
his losses. Thus, the initial margin is an amount of money7 which aims to cover the maximal loss 
an operator may encounter during one day on the exchange. Every participant, buyer or seller, 
has to make an initial margin. The level of the initial margin, which is determined by the clearing 
house, represents approximately 1 to 10% of the value of the exchanged contracts8.  
The management of credit risk by the clearing house induces administrative and financial 
costs for all participants: indeed, they must follow, day after day, the value of their position on the 
market, and they have to manage daily the cash flows associated with the margin calls. As a 
                                                 
7 Most of the time, the initial margin is not paid cash. It corresponds to Treasury Bonds, or to a credit line.  
8 Thus, transactions on derivative markets induce a leverage effect, as there is a need to invest only 1 to 10% of the value 
of the position. However, if the level of initial margin which is necessary to manage the credit risk is correctly appreciated 
by the clearing house, this should endanger the functioning of the market.     27/04/2009 
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consequence, some of the operators may prefer, at least for a certain proportion of their activity, 
the use of the OTC market. Thus, organized and over-the-counter markets are more 
complementary than competing forms of organization.  
 
2.2.2. Over-the-counter (OTC) markets 
 
  In over-the-counter markets, contracts are entered into through private 
negotiation. These markets may be considered as decentralized networks of participants, 
as there is no clearing house. In the absence of an institution collecting all orders – and 
prices – OTC markets are quite opaque (which does not mean that they do not perform 
well).  
  Instruments negotiated on OTC markets closely match the needs of hedgers. The 
absence of standardization gives the possibility to ensure a perfect hedge. It also 
contributes to the opacity of the market, because instruments and prices are not easily 
comparables. Moreover, as OTC contracts are specific, the liquidity is low in such 
markets: whenever the buyer of a hedge revises his mind and decides that he no longer 
needs his protection, he must most of the time sell the contract back to the financial 
institution which formerly sold it to him. When the product is complex and specific, the 
negotiation can turn at the advantage of the financial institution, because the 
competition is not very high on such products.  
  The absence of a clearing house also signifies that the participants must manage 
themselves the credit risk associated to their transactions. Each operator is indeed 
exposed to the risk that his counterpart defaults. The longer is the maturity of the 
commitment, the higher is the risk. Thus mutual confidence becomes very important. 
Quite often, the market participants know each others, and they are far less numerous 
than in organized markets9.  
  OTC markets are thus different from organized markets, as Table 5 summarizes 
it. They are not substitute from each others: the former are particularly useful for 
industrials looking for a perfect protection against prices risks, whereas the latter are 
especially important for professionals offering a protection in OTC markets, and seeking 








                                                 
9 On the currency market, which is the second most important OTC market worldwide (after interest rates), the five most 
important operators represent more than 60% of the transactions in 2007.     27/04/2009 
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Table 5. Futures versus OTC transactions 
  Futures transactions  OTC transactions 
Standardization  Extreme Non-existent 
Physical delivery  Exceptional Normal 
Liquidity  High Almost  null 
Funds required  Initial margin and 
margin calls 










2.3. The new frontier in derivative markets 
 
  Recently, the “landscape” of derivative markets became more complex, especially 
in the energy field. More precisely, the frontier between organized and OTC markets has 
become permeable. The reason explaining such an evolution is that operators are more 
and more concerned about credit risk. In the energy field, the move towards a relative 
integration of OTC and organized markets has been initiated by the Intercontinental 
Exchange (Ice). The latter gained in importance after Enron’s bankruptcy when it first 
proposed to the participants of the energy markets an activity of electronic brokerage.  
  As OTC markets are decentralized, the brokerage activity is essential because it 
conveys information. The presence of brokers improves the efficiency of the markets 
simply by facilitating the matching of demand and supply. During a long time, brokerage 
was undertaken by phone. Nowadays, however, men are replaced by electronic 
platforms.  
  An electronic brokerage system is especially efficient in a market when the 
negotiated instruments are somehow comparable (in other words, as soon as some kind 
of standardization appears). On energy markets some OTC derivatives, like forward 
dated Brent or swaps, were quite standardized before Ice’ apparition. In such a situation, 
it becomes very interesting, at least for hedgers, to compare the different prices offered 
by financial institutions; an electronic platform significantly enhances the possibility to 
compare prices. It is virtually not limited in the information it conveys and gives real 
time information. Thus Ice naturally imposed itself as an actor that must be addressed 
in energy markets.  
  While becoming essential in the energy OTC markets, Ice bought the most 
important organized market on energy instruments in Europe: the International 
Petroleum Exchange (Ipe). Consequently, Ice was very quickly a very important 
participant of the European energy markets, whatever their organization is concerned. 
Having acquired, through the purchase of the Ipe, the skills and knowledge of a clearing 
house, there was one more step to overcome: to give the possibility to manage, through    27/04/2009 
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the clearing house, the credit risk associated to OTC derivatives.  
  Today, Ice gives indeed the possibility to negotiate “cleared OTC derivatives”. The 
management of credit risk relies on initial margins and margin calls, on the basis of a 
valuation model which is chosen by the clearing house and which depends, naturally, on 
the specific derivative instrument under consideration.  
  Such a system introduces a great flexibility for the participants of the market. 
Indeed, they have now four possibilities. The first consists in choosing a pure OTC 
product. This may be interesting when the risk to hedge is very complicated, or when the 
confidentiality of the deal must be preserved10. The second possibility is the choice of an 
OTC product which is proposed on the electronic brokerage system. This may be 
interesting when the risk to hedge is rather standard, stimulating thus the competition 
between several financial institutions. Third possibility: retaining a cleared OTC 
product. Such a choice is interesting when there is not enough mutual confidence 
between the two counterparts as far as the credit risk is concerned. It entails, however, 
financial and administrative costs due to the initial margin and margin costs. Lastly, it 
is also possible to trade on the basis of pure futures contracts, which are very liquid.  
  Thus, since the beginning of the XXI° century, the organization of energy 
derivative markets has dramatically changed. The different segments of the markets are 
now much more interlinked that a few years ago. Naturally, such an evolution raises the 
question of systemic risk. We will answer that question a bit later, in the end of this 
chapter.  
 
3. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF DERIVATIVE MARKETS 
 
  Derivative markets: what are they done for? If their first function is the 
management of prices risk, they also authorize speculation and arbitrage, price and 
volatility discovery, and transactional efficiency.  
 
3.1. Risk management 
 
As mentioned previously, derivative markets are created when there is volatility 
on the underlying asset. Their main function is to insure a protection against the price 
fluctuations of the underlying asset11. Hedgers are usually willing to pay for such a 
service. Their transactions on derivative markets do not aim to create a profit.  
In derivative markets, the risk is managed in a specific way, by transferring it 
through different categories of participants. Usually, indeed, hedgers transfer their risk 
to those willing to assume it. Consequently, risk is not pooled as in insurance. Nor is it 
                                                 
10 Even if Ice does not act as broker or as a clearing house in this part of the market, it is still active: indeed, it proposes 
an electronic system which authorizes a very rapid and efficient way to confirm the trades on pure OTC products.  
11 Thus, derivative markets are not capital markets. Their first function is not to raise funds. The explanation of the initial 
margin mechanism (see box n°2) also explains that derivative markets obviously can do a very poor job in recycling 
petrodollars.    27/04/2009 
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diversified, as in portfolio management. Transferring the risk implies to reallocate it 
between operators. It never means that risk disappears. When somebody earns some 
money in the market, somebody else looses: derivative markets are zero sum games, and 
they should not be compared with casinos. 
Frequently, risk is not only transferred from a hedger to another participant of 
the market. Through standardization and the very high liquidity of the market, when a 
hedger gets rid of his risk, the latter is “sliced” into small parts, and it is assumed by 
several persons. This possibility to distribute the risk among several operators explains 
why the volume of transactions recorded on derivative markets may by far more 
important than the quantities produced on the physical market. This is neither a 
problem, nor the sign of a poor functioning of the market. On the contrary, the possibility 
to share the risk with numerous counterparts can reduce the price to pay to obtain a 
protection against prices fluctuations on the underlying asset. Naturally, when there is a 
possibility to distribute the risk among several operators, it is not always easy – 
especially on “pure” OTC markets – to know where the risk is and who handles it.  
 
3.2. Speculation and arbitrage 
 
  As mentioned before, hedging does not aim to earn money. Conversely, the profit 
is the explicit objective of speculation. This should not be a surprise: speculators take on 
the risks that hedgers wish to avoid. Thus, they ask for a remuneration of the service 
that they offer; and this service is essential. One could think that there is no need to 
speculators as, in a derivative market hedgers looking for a protection against a fall in 
prices are facing hedgers looking for a protection against a rise in prices. The trouble is, 
if they understand correctly the functioning of the physical market, these two kinds of 
hedgers will have the same kind of expectations concerning the future evolution of the 
prices; and when all the market thinks that there will be a rise in prices, hedgers looking 
for a protection against a fall vanish… This is the reason why there is a need for 
speculators.  
It is also important that speculators are numerous in a derivative market, in 
order to “slice” the risk into several parts. A speculator indeed “bets” that the market as 
a whole is wrong, a least on a very short horizon of time. Whenever its bet reveals that it 
was wrong, the speculator must have the possibility to quit the market very quickly: he 
is not strong enough to fight against the rest of the participants. Meanwhile, he will 
leave the place to another short term bet on a small part of the risk, undertaken by 
another speculator.  
  Thus speculators earn money while allowing the hedger to find a protection 
against price fluctuations. They have a critical function. 
  A r b i t r a g e  a l s o  a i m s  t o  m a k e  a  p r o f i t .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  d o e s  i t  o n  a  d i f f e r e n t  w a y .  
Arbitrage indeed exploits what is usually referred to as an “abnormal situation”, on an 
economic point of view. Such an abnormal situation may be due to an unexpected event    27/04/2009 
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having a strong impact on prices. As arbitrage is not supposed to be risky (another 
difference with speculation), the possibility to make a risk-less profit attracts a lot of 
operators and the abnormal situation disappears. Thus, the presence of arbitragers in a 
derivative market is also very important because they insure, among other things, that 
prices on derivative markets remain linked with the prices of the underlying asset. In 
other words, arbitragers allow for the convergence of derivatives and physical markets 
… and for stronger links between markets (see Box 3 for more details).  
  Naturally, things are not so simple. Hedging, speculation and arbitrage are not as 
separated concepts as they may appear in the preceding lines. Sometimes hedging can 
turn into speculation, for example when a hedger renounce to his hedge on a futures 
contract in order to benefit from a favourable evolution in prices. In certain situation, 
arbitrage can also turn into speculation. And these changes render very difficult the 
study of hedging, speculation and arbitrage.  
 
Box 3. The role of arbitrage in the convergence between the physical and 
financial markets 
 
In every futures market, even if this is exceptional, it is always possible to deliver 
the underlying asset at the expiration of the futures contracts. This possibility, 
associated with arbitrage operations, insure that there is no disconnection between the 
financial and the physical markets. Let us illustrate this point with an example.  
Suppose that, a few days before delivery, the price on the spot market is 140, and 
that the futures prices of the contract reaching its expiration dates is 150. In such a 
situation, an arbitrager may buy spot the merchandise and simultaneously sell it on the 
futures market. Meanwhile, he announces to the clearing house that he will deliver the 
physical product at expiration. Doing so, the arbitrager earns 10 (minus the costs 
associated to the delivery of the merchandise: transport, storage during a few days, etc). 
Because this operation is profitable and risk-less, there is an incentive for all the 
participants to do the same thing. Thus, the physical price rises under the pressure of 
arbitragers buying the merchandise, while, as a result of sales, the futures prices 
diminishes. Arbitrage operations insure the convergence between the physical and 
financial markets. They stop only when their profit does not exceed their costs anymore. 
 
3.3. Price discovery  
 
  A third important function of derivative markets is price discovery12. Derivative 
markets (especially futures markets) indeed give the possibility to obtain information on 
prices for different maturities. In futures markets, this information is publicly available 
and free. Moreover, as futures contracts are standardized, prices are comparable. Last 
                                                 
12 On the information role of futures markets, one may consult, for example, Grossman, 1977.     27/04/2009 
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but not least, they are reliable, as these markets are characterized by an important 
transactions’ volume13.  
  The information conveyed by futures prices is important because they represent 
an expectation of the value of the future spot price at the delivery date T, conditionally to 
the current available information (at t, for example). Naturally, information concerning 
the market will change between the present date and delivery, and these changes are all 
the more significant that the distance between these two dates is important. Still, 
futures prices are considered as the best estimators of future spot prices.  
  Because futures markets fulfil this informational role, they allow for spatial and 
inter-temporal allocation of resources.  
The role of futures markets in spatial allocation may be illustrated by the crude 
oil market. There are two important futures contracts in the case of crude oil: the Light 
Sweet Crude Oil and the Brent futures contracts. Prices of the former stand for the 
American market, whereas the latter is representative of the European market. Usually, 
the spread between the two futures contracts represents two dollars per barrel. When 
this spread rises, it becomes interesting to reallocate some tankers from Europe to 
United States, for example.  
The role of futures markets in the inter-temporal allocation of resources comes 
from the fact that several futures contracts for different delivery dates are 
simultaneously traded. The relationship between futures prices for different delivery 
dates is usually referred to as the term structure of futures prices or as the prices curve. 
The latter may be monotonically increasing, decreasing. It may also sunken or dumped, 
for example. All these shapes give information on the way to correctly hedge positions 
that are hold on the physical market. More over, there give also guidelines for 
production, transformation, storage and even – in certain specific cases, in particular 
when the maturity of the longer futures contract is important – for investment decisions. 
For example, when the nearest futures prices are lower than longer one – then, the 
market is in contango – there is an incentive for the participants of the physical market 
to buy the merchandise in order to constitute physical stocks. When, conversely, the 
prices curve is decreasing, the market is in backwardation, and the operators are 
prompted to sell their inventories.  
Thus, futures prices motivate financial operations, like hedging, speculation and 
arbitrage, but also industrial operations. This is one of the reasons why one may think 
about derivative markets as a way to stabilize prices in the physical market through 
optimal production decisions. Thus, prices established in futures markets are very 
important because they are used by producers, industrials and consumers. And more 
importantly, as futures prices give a reference to trade quality differentials, they are also 
used by those, throughout the world, that are not directly involved in the exchange, but 
concerned by the underlying asset.  
                                                 
13 Moreover, in over-the-counter markets, prices reporting mechanism does not force the operators to disclose their 
transactions prices.     27/04/2009 
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3.4. Volatility discovery  
 
Provided that there are options traded in the exchange, the informational role of 
derivative markets extends itself to volatility. The latter is the main determinant of 
options prices. It is so important that options markets are usually referred to as 
volatility markets.  
There are several possible definitions of volatility. The most well-known is 
historical volatility, which is computed on the basis of the fluctuation of past prices on a 
certain period of time. In the presence of actively traded options, there is a possibility to 
compute another kind of volatility, usually called implied volatility. The latter is the 
standard deviation which equates the market price and the theoretical price of the 
option derived from a model. Whereas historical volatility incorporates solely past prices, 
implied volatility discloses operators’ expectations on future volatility (conditionally to 
the available current information). This information is very important as it gives an 
estimation of the (past and future) risks associated to the positions hold in the market.  
 
3.5. Transactional efficiency 
 
  The last important function of futures market is the reduction of transaction 
costs. Futures markets give a direct and free access to competitive trading, insuring 
reliable prices. Meanwhile, they create benchmarks that are used as a reference to trade 
over the counter transactions and quality differentials. The existence of such 
benchmarks reduces transaction costs.  
 
4. SHOULD WE BE WORRIED ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY DERIVATIVE MARKETS?  
 
The sustained development of derivative markets and their complexity entertains 
certain fears and raises interrogations. Among them, it is possible to quote the influence 
of derivative markets on physical markets, the systemic risk, and the worry that 
derivative markets might be intrinsically dangerous.  
 
4.1. The influence of the derivative markets on the physical markets 
 
  A recurrent question about derivative markets is whether their presence creates 
volatility in excess on physical markets14. Where it the case, it would be a real problem, 
because derivative markets are supposed to be an answer to, and not a source of 
volatility on the physical market.  
  One may consider that derivative markets create some volatility in excess, 
because they allow for very rapid and easy trades. The standardization of futures 
                                                 
14 Mayhew (2000) proposes a quite extensive literature review on that subject.    27/04/2009 
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contracts, the presence of a clearing house, and the possibility – with electronic 
platforms – to trade at every hour of the day, indeed gives the possibility to immediately 
react to information affecting the market of the underlying asset. Moreover, derivatives 
market allows for noise trading, i.e. disturbing actions of operators taking advantage of 
the existence of such a market to speculate more easily, without special concern for the 
underlying asset. If that point of view is retained, chances are high that there is an 
increase of volatility due to the presence of a derivative market. However, this is not a 
real problem if this volatility is mostly an intra-day one, reflecting the promotion of 
informative signals and the redistribution of risk between different categories of 
operators which are more or less risk averse.  
More important is the long run volatility (on a monthly, weekly, or even daily 
basis). This phenomenon may be investigated when a new derivative market – ie futures 
contracts – is created on a specific underlying asset. Such an introduction gives an 
occasion to compare prices volatility before and after the creation of the derivative 
market. Empirical studies on this question15 usually lead to the conclusion that an 
abnormal volatility is observed just after the introduction. However, this abnormal 
volatility disappears quickly, and subsequent introductions of other derivatives – like 
options, for example – seem to have no effect. Moreover, several studies have examined 
the influence of derivatives trading on the depth and liquidity of the underlying market. 
Their analysis reveals quite often a strong inverse relationship between the open 
interest16 in futures contracts and the spot market’s volatility. This finding indicates 
that the futures market provides depth and liquidity to the crude oil market.  
Another and more important question is whether on the long run, derivative 
markets become nowadays more volatile, more speculative than before? This question 
gained in importance during the last decade, as a result of the intensified presence of 
certain categories of investors such as hedge funds. The untimely and heavy 
interventions of these actors, using commodity markets for diversification purposes, and 
considering commodity as a new class of asset, could indeed have an impact on the 
prices.  
The presence of such operators may indeed be disturbing because their 
transactions do not always depend on information related to commodities: they could 
also arise from a sudden change in the stock or bond markets, for example. Thus, if these 
speculators invest a lot of money in commodity markets, there is a fear that they induce 
prices moves having no relationship with commodity supply, production, inventory and 
demand. Moreover, as there is a strong correlation between spot and futures prices, a 
price’s shock on the futures prices of a specific commodity may spread to the physical 
market. The more pessimistic scenario foretells the contagion to other markets, 
                                                 
15 See for example Fleming and Ostdiek (1999). 
16 The open interest is a very interesting statistics for derivative markets. It represents the number of contracts still hold 
by operators at the end of a trading day. Thus, it gives an idea of how many participants hold their position more than one 
day. As usually, arbitragers and speculators compensate their position in one day (creating intra-day volatility). Thus, 
open interest is often considered as a way to appreciate how much hedgers are present in the market.     27/04/2009 
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especially in energy markets, as we will see in 4.2. However, as far as we know, no 
serious study has reached such a conclusion. On the contrary, Robes et al (2008) show 
that until now, it is not possible to prove that portfolio diversification towards 
commodities has a specific impact on their prices.  
 
4.2. Contagion effect and the integration of commodity markets 
 
Another source of questions about commodity markets comes from the fact that 
they are more and more integrated, raising the fear of systemic risk. As a result of 
tightened cross market linkages, a shock induced by traders or speculators may spread, 
not only to the physical market, but also to other derivative markets. This question has 
been investigated through different ways. The first is the study of the impact of traders 
on derivative markets through the such-called “herding phenomenon”. The second is the 
study of spatial and temporal integration.  
In 1990, Pindyck and Rotenberg propose to define herding by a situation where 
traders are alternatively bullish or bearish on all commodities for no plausible economic 
reasons. Herding is a possible explanation for the excess co-movement that is observed 
on the prices of different commodities, namely their persistent tendency to move 
together. This co-movement can be observed on quite a broad set of markets. It can 
partially be explained by macro-economic variables: the expected inflation, the growth in 
industrial production, the consumer price index, several exchange rates, interest rates, 
money supply, etc. However, if the co-movement is in excess of anything that could be 
explained by these common variables, herding could explain this excess. Several studies 
have been performed on commodity markets in order to confirm this hypothesis. Pindyck 
and Rotenberg conclude that there is herding on commodity prices. The results of Booth 
and Cinner (2001) on Asian agricultural commodity prices support, on the contrary, the 
common economic fundamentals assumption.  
Another way to deal with the subject of derivatives and their impact on 
commodity prices is to focus on the spatial integration of commodity prices. Jumah, and 
Karbuz (1999) study the spatial integration in the cocoa market, using prices extracted 
from London and New York futures markets. Interest rates are found to play a key role 
in establishing long-run relationship between prices. The authors also show that futures 
prices adjust more quickly to new information, compared to spot prices. Ewing and 
Harter (2000) study the co-movements of Alaska North Slope and UK Brent crude oil 
prices. Their results show that these oil markets share a long-run common trend, which 
suggests that the two markets are “unified”: there is price convergence in the markets. 
Kleit (2001) also examines the spatial integration of the crude oil markets. He studies 
seven types of crude oils. All of them are light crude oils, in order to reduce problems 
associated with quality differentials. His results show that oil markets are growing more 
unified. All these works are important because spatial integration could exaggerate the 
possible negative influence of derivatives on commodity markets. This question is    27/04/2009 
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especially important for energy markets, as they become more and more integrated: 
many energy derivatives involve cross-market counterparties. Thus, derivatives can 
spread the disturbance or crisis in one energy market to another.  
The debate on the effects of derivatives trading and contagion effect is also closely 
related to the issue of temporal integration. Whereas the spatial integration has already 
been examined in commodity markets, temporal integration was not widely studied. 
Relying on the “preferred habitat” theory, which is applied to the American crude oil 
market, Lautier (2005) investigates whether this market is segmented or not. 
Segmentation is defined as a situation in which different parts of the prices curve are 
disconnected from each others. The study shows that the crude oil futures market is 
segmented into three parts. The first corresponds to maturities below 28 months, the 
second is situated between the 29th and 47th months, and the third consists of maturities 
ranging from the 4th to 7th years. Moreover, chances are high that this segmentation 
would evolve trough time, because since the date it was launched, the crude oil futures 
market has matured. Indeed, the American futures market has experienced a sustained 
growth in its transactions volume, pushing away the boundary of actively traded 
contracts. This phenomenon is reported in most derivatives markets – and it is especially 
important, since 2000, in commodity markets at large, and more specifically, in energy 
markets – and one can expect that segmentation will move to longer maturities in the 
future.  
The question of temporal segmentation has crucial implications. Where the 
markets perfectly integrated, a shock induced on one part of the curve could spread out 
to the other parts of the curve. There would be a kind of a temporal systemic risk. 
However, the existence of a partial segmentation also raises some difficulty. Indeed, 
segmentation has an impact for financial decisions, particularly for all the hedging and 
valuation operations relying on the relationship between different futures prices. The 
efficiency of these strategies can be affected by differences in the information content of 
futures prices. It is also the case of investment decision, when the latter is based on the 
extrapolation from observed prices curves to value cash flows for maturities that are not 
available on the market17. All these operations rely on term structure models of 
commodity prices. Such a tool aims to reproduce the futures prices observed in the 
market as accurately as possible and to extend the curve for very long maturities. 
However, its use requires the estimation of its parameters, and the latter may depend on 






                                                 
17 For this kind of analysis, see for example Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Schwartz (1997, 1998), Cortazar and Schwartz 
(1998), Schwartz and Smith (2000), Cortazar et al (2001).    27/04/2009 
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4.3. Are derivative markets intrinsically dangerous? 
 
Apart from the fear of systematic risk, a question remains: are derivative markets 
intrinsically dangerous? Once again, the answer is not straightforward. There are some 
reasons to fear, associated to leverage effect, complexity, opacity, and liquidity. However, 
all fears are not necessarily justified.  
The presence of a leverage effect is one of the most important characteristic of 
derivative markets. Leverage means that there is an important difference between the 
price exposure of a position, which is measured by the value of the derivative contract, 
and which depends on the volatility of the underlying asset, and the investment required 
in order to enter the contract. In the case of organized markets, this investment is 
materialized by the initial margin, which represents 1 to 10% of the positions value. In 
the case of over-the-counter markets, this investment is sometimes equal to zero, or 
equivalent to the implicit value of the confidence of the counterpart in the transaction. In 
other words, derivatives lower the cost of taking on price exposure. This is perfectly true. 
Moreover, in the case of organized markets, the cost is even lower because the presence 
of the clearing house and the use of electronic platforms reduce strongly transaction 
costs. Last but not least, the cost is also reduced by the very important liquidity on such 
markets.  
Are there some counterweights to leverage effect? Part of the answer is yes, part 
is no. The counterweight, in the case of organized markets, lies essentially on margin 
calls. There is a possibility to suffer huge financial losses in organized markets. 
However, a participant can not stay in the market if he is not able to absorb these losses, 
day after day. Moreover, there are rules in these markets in order to avoid the 
possibility, for a trader, to take a very large position (i.e. more than 10% of the market) 
and to suffer, in one day, dramatic losses. In the case of over-the-counter markets, when 
the clearing house does not interfere in the transactions, the only counterweights are, 
first the mutual confidence between the participants of the market, second the ability to 
measure correctly the risk undertaken through transactions involving derivative 
products. Whenever this confidence relies on bad foundations, or this ability is not as 
good as supposed, there may be difficulties. Part of the crisis linked with the derivative 
transactions on sub-primes credit is due to risk underestimation. On this point of view, 
the movement of the frontier between organized and OTC market is good news. Reminds 
that, when a clearing house interferes in a transaction, it assumes credit risk, chooses 
the valuation model that will be applied to the transaction, and estimates the price risk 
associated to the transaction, in order to define the amount of the initial margin.  
  The second potential problem with derivatives is the complexity of instruments 
traded. The markets always offer new products – there is a marketing dimension in 
derivatives, as well as in other goods – and the functioning of these products are not 
always perfectly understood by all of their potential users, at least at the beginning 
(problems usually arise in markets that are not matures). The use of derivative products    27/04/2009 
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requires clearly technical competences, and the more the markets evolve, the more these 
competences rise. Once again, complexity is more important in OTC markets, for a very 
simple reason. These markets indeed give the possibility to find the perfect hedge, i.e. 
potentially very specific protections against prices fluctuations. These perfect hedges 
would not be possible in the case of organized markets, because of the necessarily 
standardization. However, such a benefit afforded by OTC markets signifies, in return, 
that the negotiated products are sometimes very complicated. Is this complexity always 
totally explained by a real necessity to offer a protection against a very specific 
exposition? We leave this question open.  
  Complexity of the products, absence of a systematic price reporting system – 
which would be difficult to maintain and not really useful because the negotiated 
products are not standardized – transactions based on mutual agreements…, all these 
characteristics of over-the-counter markets favour their opacity. The lack of 
transparency in these markets is undeniable, at least for some transactions – remember 
that in order to facilitate the transfer of certain derivative products, some of them are 
standardized, and that this part of the activity on OTC markets is rising very quickly. 
For financial institutions offering hedging services against prices fluctuations, opacity 
may be a way to restore commercial margins that are, simultaneously, dramatically 
endangered by electronic trading and by the severe competition on organized markets. 
Nevertheless, there is a real need for specific hedging products and it is not absurd that 
financial institutions are paid for assuming the risk transferred by their client – which is 
not always easy to hedge, especially when the derivative products are complex. 
Moreover, some participants of the markets might appreciate opacity as it gives them 
the possibility to undertake discretely some transactions. The OTC market gives the 
possibility to realize huge deals which, where they known, would have been able to 
punctually destabilize the market.  
  As far as liquidity is concerned, there are three problems with derivatives. First, 
the high liquidity of organized markets is an incitation for noise traders to take positions 
that may create intra-day volatility. Noise arises from the action of agents who falsely 
believe that they possess valuable information about what should be the correct price 
and trade accordingly. Noise traders include investors using technical – as opposed to 
fundamental – analysis, trend followers, herders, etc. Although these traders are useful 
as they serve as liquidity providers for informed investors, they may be responsible for 
excessive short-term volatility due to over-trading, bad timing of their trades, over-
reactions to good and bad news, etc. This point has already been commented in 4.1. 
Second problem, liquidity is not regularly organised through time. Third, over-the-
counter markets are prone to illiquidity problems.  
  In most derivative markets, the transactions volume is not regularly distributed 
along the prices curve18. Indeed, the short-term maturities are highly traded, whereas 
                                                 
18 This is also true for open interest.     27/04/2009 
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liquidity may be very poor on long-term maturities. For example, as depicted by Figure 
1, on the European petroleum market, between 2000 and 2007, the one-month Brent 
futures contract represents 45.93% of the total volume on the first six maturities, the 
two-months futures contracts amounts for 33.91% of the volume, and the three-months 
contracts, 11.89%. This distribution of transaction volumes might create difficulties for 
long term operations on the derivative markets. Indeed, as long-term prices do not rely 
on actively traded contract, one might ask whether these prices are reliable. Three 
answers can be given to this problem.  
First, the prices can be considered as all the more reliable that the integration of 
the prices curve is strong. Where the markets fully integrated on their temporal 
dimension, the information conveyed by short term prices would spread rapidly to long-
term maturities. Still, it is true that long term prices are supposed to depend on specific 
variables which do not affect short-term prices: changes in technologies, inflation, 
demand pattern, prices for competing energy and changes in environmental constraints 
are more important for long term prices than inventories, temporarily supply disruption, 
strikes, or seasonality, for example.  
Figure 1. Transactions volumes, in percentage by maturity, on the Brent 
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  A second possible answer is that transactions’ volume is not necessarily the best 
criterion that may be used in order to appreciate the informational content of long-term 
futures prices. Indeed, when investment banks use long-term futures contracts to hedge 
their residual risk, one transaction per year may be sufficient – for example to hedge 
swaps having a one-year periodicity. And investment banks are more and more active on 
long-term futures contracts, as Haigh et al (2007) stated it.     27/04/2009 
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  Third, it is always possible to cover long-term positions with short-term 
instruments. Naturally, such a strategy is more risky and requires high technical 
competences. Just recall of Metallgesellschaft19, which in 1994 tried to do this… and lost 
USD 2.4 billions! 
  Whereas organized markets are characterized by an irregular distribution of 
liquidity along the term structure, over-the-counter markets are prone to illiquidity 
problems, whatever the maturity is concerned. These problems are directly linked with 
the organization of such markets. Reminds that OTC markets are informal networks, 
organized around the most important and active operators. At critical times, the latter 
can vanish or, if they have to stay and offer some prices – such is the case for “market 
makers” – they might propose prices with no economical sense or, to put it in financial 
words, with an extraordinarily high liquidity premium. The evolution of the credit 
market during the summer 2007 is a perfect example of such a problem.  
  There are undoubtedly some dangers with derivative markets, as explained 
above. However, the most important are probably linked with not mature markets, 
complex products and above all, unadvised traders. A lot of worries about derivative 
markets come from misunderstanding. Such misunderstanding can create some real 
difficulties, as was the case, for example, with securitization in 2007-2008. They are 
entertained by the tremendous transactions volume, volatility, and by the sustained 
developments of such markets. Consequently, there is probably a need to explain more 
often, more clearly, what derivative markets are and how they work. All other problems 
– ie leverage effect, opacity, liquidity – may be overcome, provided that there is no 
possibility to enforce the rules governing the markets, especially the organized markets. 
A vast majority of the problems recorded on derivative markets indeed finds its roots in 




  Since the turning of the XXIst century, energy derivative grow at a tremendous 
rate. They are the most actively traded commodities, and also the more volatile. Is it 
dangerous? By explaining what energy derivative markets are today, how they work, 
what their economic function is, and what their possible risks are, this chapter tries to 
bring an answer to that difficult question. Naturally, the answer is not straightforward. 
Moreover, it is difficult to summarize it in a few words.  
  One important feature of derivative markets is their complexity. Undoubtedly, 
derivative instruments are complex. So is the organization of derivative markets, 
especially in the energy field. This characteristic is harmful, as it may turn away some 
potential users (for example, developing countries) of energy derivative markets. Yet, 
                                                 
19 For more details on the Metallgesellschaft case, see for example Edwards and Canter (1995), Culp and Miller (1994) or 
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they could be extremely useful, especially when the wealth of these countries relies 
strongly on energy resources.  
The complexity of derivative markets does not mean, however, that they do not 
work well. Remember that in 2006 11,859.27 millions of futures and options contracts 
were traded in the world. Moreover, this number represents only the deals on organized 
markets. Would it be possible to make such an amount of transactions with an inefficient 
trading scheme? Probably not. Derivative markets do not only work well. They also fulfil 
economic functions rendering them extremely useful, especially in the energy field, 
which is characterized by a high volatility.  
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